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360 GoNzAr,Es v. INDUSTRIAL Ace. CoM. [50 C.2d 
[L.A. No. 24851. In Bank. May 27, 1958.] 
EDWARD GONZALES, Petitioner, v. INDUSTRIAL 
ACCIDENT COMMISSION et al., Respondents. 
[1] Workmen's Compensation- Proceedings- Witnesses-Cross-
examination.-Denial of a claimant's right to cross-examine 
the Industrial Accident Commission's rating expert in a work-
men's compensation proceeding is a denial of due process, but 
where the commission granted the claimant's application for 
reconsideration of its decision and he was afforded a hearing 
to cross-examine the rating expert, following which the com-
mission reaffirmed its previous decision, the claimant was not 
denied due process. 
[2] !d.-Proceedings-Continuing Jurisdiction Over Orders and 
Awards.-Where the Subsequent Injuries Fund filed its peti-
tion for reconsideration of a decision of the Industrial Accident 
Commission within 20 days after the referee's amended find-
ings and within five years from the date of injury, and such 
petition, which was granted, was filed pursuant to Lab. Code, 
§ 5900, a final order of the commission, which related solely 
to proceedings for reconsideration under chapter 7 of part 4 
of division 4 of the Labor Code, was within the jurisdiction 
of the commission, though more than five years had elapsed 
after the injury occurred, since there was no provision in 
chapter 7 limiting the time within which the commission could 
make its decision on reconsideration. 
[3] Id.-Certiorari-Review.-]'indings of the Industrial Accident 
Commission are not subject to review on the ground that 
there is no substantial evidence to sustain them except insofar 
as it may appear that they have been made without any 
evidence whatever in their support. 
[4] !d.-Permanent Disability-Effect of Prior Disability.-It is 
error to rate a congenital condition of deaf-mutism to which 
a claimant for workmen's compensation has so far adjusted 
[1] See Cal.Jur., 'Vorkmen's Compensation, § 147; Am.Jur., 
Workmen's Compensation, § 458. 
[2] See Cal.Jur., Workmen's Compensation, § 160; Am.Jur., 
Workmen's Compensation, § 519. 
[3] See Cal.Jur., Workmen's Compensation, § 213 et seq.; Am. 
Jur., Workmen's Compensation, § 522 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Workmen's Compensation, § 153; 
[2] Workmen's Compensation, § 205; [3] \Vorkmen's Compensa-
tion, § 267; [ 4] Workmen's Compensation, § 221; [5] Workmen's 
Compensation, § 222. 
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himself us to be reasonably employable after the as well 
as before the smne standard that it would have been rated 
if he had lost his hearing and speeeh in the same aeeident in 
which he received the industrial injury. 
[5] !d.-Benefits Recoverable--Determination of Percentage of 
Disability.-·-\Vhere the evidence in a workmen's compensation 
case disdosed that the daimant had been a deaf-mnte from 
the age of 5 and was unable to read lips, that he had learned 
the painting trade when he Wtls 14, that he had been a prize 
fighter and an aircraft worker during the war, that he had 
joined the painters' union and had worked steadily from that 
time until the accident in question, the commission properly 
reasoned that claimant had lived with his condition all his 
life and that there was no showing that the industrially-caused 
injury would force him to change his occupation, in which case 
his congenital deaf-mutism might be a greater handicap, and 
that since the lower rating, added to the percentage of total 
disability resulting from the industrial accident, did not equal 
the 70 per cent required by Lab. Code, § 4751, he was not 
entitled to additional benefits from the Subsequent Injuries 
J<'und. 
PROCEEDING to review a decision of the Industrial Acci-
dent Commission denying compensation from the Subsequent 
Injuries Fund. Award affirmed. 
Levy, Russell & DeRoy and Jack P. Koszdin for Petitioner. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Irving H. Perluss, 
Assistant Attorney General, F. G. Girard and Henry K. 
Workman, Deputy Attorneys General, Everett A. Corten, 
Edward ~'\.. Sarkisian, Hobert J. Calvert and Daniel C. Mur-
phy for Respondents. 
McCOMB, J.-Petitioner seeks annulment of a decision 
made by respondent Industrial Accident Commission denying 
him compensation from the Subsequent Injuries Fund of the 
State of California. 
Facts : Petitioner is 42 years of age. He has been a deaf-
mute since he was 5 years old, and he is unable to read lips. 
He worked as a painter for a number of years prior to 
October 18, 1951, when he sustained an industrial injury 
to his back. 
On December 3, 1952, the commission awarded him benefits 
for a 21 :liz per cent permanent partial disability for the injury. 
Contemporaneously, pursuant to section 4751 of the Labor 
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and award was made 
was on the 
in a combined disability rating 
and an award was made against the Subsequent 
Fund of $7,020 plus a lifetime pension. 
On March 13, 1956, the Subsequent Injuries Fund's peti-
tion to reopen the cause was granted. 
On 6, 1956, after a hearing, a referee made an 
order and award amending the previous finding of Decem-
ber 3, 1952, by increasing the rating for petitioner's combined 
from 80 per cent to 88 per cent. 
On August 24, 1956, the Subsequent Injuries Fund filed its 
petition for reconsideration, which was granted, and the com-
mission rerated petitioner's disability for deaf-mutism on the 
basis of 50 per cent of the standard rating for loss of speech 
and loss of hearing industrially caused. This resulted in a 
combined rating of 55% per cent, following which an order 
of the commission was filed October 10, 1956, directing that 
petitioner take nothing from the Subsequent Injuries Fund. 
Thereafter, pursuant to petitioner's application, a further 
hearing was held to permit petitioner to cross-examine the 
rating expert, who testified, in substance, that he was in-
structed to issue a rating of 50 per cent of the standard 
schedule rating for loss of speech and for loss of hearing; that 
he did not take into consideration petitioner's inability to read 
lips; and that there -vvas no rating for deaf-mutism as such 
in the rating schedule, but only ratings for loss of hearing 
and loss of speech separately. 
On January 23, 1957, the commission affirmed its decision 
of October 10, 1956, that petitioner take nothing from the 
Subsequent Injuries Fund. 
[1] Petitioner contends: 
First. That the commission's decision of October 10, 1956, 
was rnade without affording hirn the right to cross-exarnine 
the mting expert and that he was th1ts denied his consti-
tutional right of due process. 
'l'his contention is devoid of merit under the facts in the 
present case. On October 3, 1956, after granting the petition 
of the Subsequent Injuries Fund for reconsideration, the 
commission requested from the rating bureau a recommended 
permanent disability rating on the basis of 50 per cent of 
the standard rating for loss of speech and loss of hearing. 
On October 8, 1956, the commission gave notice that the 
report had been received from the rating bureau and that 
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the case would be submitted for decision seven days thereafter 
unless good cause was shown to the contrary. However, two 
days later, on October 10, 1956, the commission made its 
decision, after reconsideration, rerating petitioner's combined 
disability at less than 70 per cent. 
Section 5704 of the Labor Code provides: ''. . . of 
all reports and other matters added to the otherwise 
than during the course of an open hearing, shall be served 
upon the parties to the proceeding, and an opportunity shall 
be given to produce evidence in explanation or rebuttal 
thereof before decision is rendered." Commission Rule No. 
10929 provides: "After the Permanent Disability Rating 
Bureau has prepared the recommended rating and the rating 
specialist has signed it, it shall be returned to the person 
requesting the recommended rating, who shall thereupon cause 
it to be served on all interested parties, together with a notice 
that the case will be submitted for decision seven days after 
the date of service, unless good cause to the contrary is shown 
in writing prior thereto.'' 
In making its decision on October 10, 1956, the commission 
did not accord petitioner the required seven days within which 
to object to the recommended rating or to request a hearing 
for the purpose of cross-examining the rating expert. It is 
settled that the denial of such a right of cross-examination is 
a denial of due process. (Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Indus-
trial Ace. Com., 47 Cal.App.2d 713, 715 [118 P.2d 848]; 
Walker Min. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Corn., 35 Cal.App.2d 257, 
262 [95 P.2d 188] [hearing denied by the Supreme Court].) 
However, in the present case the commission granted peti-
tioner's application for reconsideration, and he was afforded 
a hearing to cross-examine the rating expert, following which 
the commission reaffirmed its order of October 10, 1956. Thus, 
petitioner, having been afforded an opportunity of cross-
examination at the subsequent hearing, was not denied due 
process in the instant case. (Walsh v. Industrial Ace. Corn., 
1 Cal.2d 747, 748 [I] [36 P.2d 1072].) 
[2] Second. That the cornrnission was without jurisdic-
tion to rnake the order of January 23, 1957, since more than 
five years had elapsed after the injury occurred. 
This contention is likewise devoid of merit. Section 5804 
of the Labor Code provides that no award of compensation 
shall be rescinded, altered, or amended after five years from 
the date of the injury. In the instant case, the injury 
occurred on October 18, 1951. The Subsequent Injuries Fund 
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filed its petition to reopen on March 13, 1956, and on August 
6, 1956, an order was made by the referee amending the find-
ing and award, all within five years from the date of the 
injury. 
Section 5900 of the Labor Code provides, in substance, 
that any person aggrieved by a final order, decision, or award 
made and filed by a commissioner or referee may petition the 
commission for reconsideration in respect to any matters 
determined or covered thereby. 
Section 5903 of the I1ahor Code provides that a petition for 
reconsideration may he filed at any time within 20 days 
after the service of any final order, decision, or award upon 
any of the grounds therein specified. 
Sections 5900 and 5903 are parts of chapter 7, entitled "Re-
consideration and Judicial Review," of part 4 of division 4. 
In the present case, respondent Subsequent Injuries Fund 
filed its petition for reconsideration within 20 days after the 
referee's amended findings and within five years from the 
date of injury. 'l'his petition for reconsideration was filed 
pursuant to the provisions of section 5900, and the final order 
of the commission made on ,January 23, 1957, which was more 
than five years from the date of the injury, related solely 
to the proceedings for reconsideration under chapter 7. 
Stdton v. Industrial Ace. Com., 46 Cal.2d 791 [298 P.2d 
857], relied on by petitioner, is not here in point. That case 
expressly points out, at page 795, that sections 5803 and 5804 
of the Labor Code applied to the proceedings there under 
consideration and that the five-year limitation within which 
the commission may amend or rescind an award is fixed by 
section 5804 of the Labor Code. There is no provision in 
chapter 7, dealing with proceedings for reconsideration and 
judicial review, limiting the time within which the commission 
may make its decision on reconsideration, and in the absence 
of a statutory limitation none will be implied. 
Third. 'l'hat the decision of the comrnission in rating his 
deaf-mutism at 50 per cent of the standard rating is not sns-
taincd by the evidence ancl is unreasonable and arbitrary. 
This contention is untenable. 
[3] (1) Findings of the Industrial Accident Commission 
are not subject to review on the ground that there is no sub-
stantial evidence to sustain th0m, except insofar as it may 
appear that they have been made without any evidence what-
ever in their support. (Douglas Aircraft, Inc. v. Indttstrial 
Ace. Com., 47 Cal.2d 903, 905 l2] [306 P.2d 425].) 
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[4] It is error to rate a congenital condition of deaf-
mutism to which petitioner haB so far adjusted himself as to 
be reasonably employalJle after the injury as well as before 
by the same standard that it would have been rated if peti-
tioner had lost hiB hearing and speech in the same accident 
iu which he reeeived the .industrial injury. (State v. Indus-
trial Ace. Com., 12fJ Cal.App.2d 802, 304 jl] l276 P.2d 
820 J jheariug deuied by the Snpn·me Court].) Petitioner's 
disability would have been mueh greater if he had had the 
normal faculties of speeeh and hearing up to the time of the 
aeeident and had lost them then, \Yith the whole period of 
adjustment to their loss before him, than it could possibly 
have been with the whole period of adjustment to their lack 
lw himl him. 
[5] In the instant case, the record discloses that petitioner 
had been a deaf-mute from the age of 5 years and was unable 
to read lips; that he had learned the painting trade when 
he was 14; that he had been a prize fighter and an aircraft 
worker during the war; and that in 1944 he joined the 
painters' union and had worked steadily from that time until 
the accident. It further discloses that since his recovery he 
has worked as steadily as any other member of the painters' 
union. 
Therefore, the commission properly reasoned that petitioner 
had lived with his condition all of his life and that there was 
no showing that the industrially-caused injury would force 
him to change his occupation, in which case his congenital 
deaf-mutism might be a greater handicap. 1 The commission 
thus concluded that since the lowered rating, added to the 
percentage of total disability resulting from the industrial 
accident, did not equal the 70 per cent required by section 
4751 of the Labor Code,2 petitioner was not entitled to 
additional benefits from the Subsequent Injuries Fund. 
1 For an excellent discussion of the concept of pennanent disability 
under the California plan and the reasoning in support of the variable 
factors taken into account thereunder, see ''Variable Factors in Penna-
nent Disability Rating, With Particular Reference to the Inclusion of 
Age and Occupation,'' by R. E. Haggard, Supervisor, Permanent Dis-
ability Rating Bureau, vol. 2, Appendix to Journal of the Senate, Cali-
fornia Regular Session, 1931, page 101 of Partial Report of Senate 
Interim Committee to the Senate on ·workmen's Compensation Benefits. 
2 Section 4 731 of the Labor Code reads as follows: "If an employee 
who is permanently partially disabled receives a subsequent compensable 
injury resulting in additional permanent partial disability so that the 
degree of disability caused by the combination of both disabilities is 
greater than that which would have resulted from the subsequent injury 
alone, and the combined effect of the last injury and the previous dis-
v. INDUSTRIAr, Ace. Co~L 
of the 
binding upon this 
court. 
In Stale v. Industrial Lice. Com., supra, :1 case almo><t iden-
tical in its facts with the present case, au order of the In-
dustrial Aeeidf'nt Cornmission recovery against 
the Fund was annulled when the com-
evidence on the question, had applied 
deaf-mutism to a ease in-
deaf-mutism. The court in such case 
the corrcc:t as that set forth under rule 
, supra. In the present case, the eommis;;;ion, in following 
this rule, concluded that deaf-mutism did not seriously affect 
petitioner's ability to be a painter and that he had adjusted 
well to his eondition. 'l'br:re is thus sufficient rvidence in the 
record to support its finding. 
The award is affirmed. 
Shenk, J., Schauer, ,J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
The majority concludes that there is some evidence to sup-
port the commission's percentage rating of petitioner's dis-
ability. I am constrained to disagree. Moreover, the effect 
of the majority holding is to defeat the principle that dictates 
that there be uniformity in awards for the same injury, which 
principle forms the basis of the theory upon >vhich the rating 
schedules are based. 
The problem in this case is to compute a disability rating 
for loss of speech and hearing sustained at age 5 on the basis 
of a rating schedule dPsigned for determining the permanent 
disability rating of a painter who sustains loss of speech 
and hearing at age 40. 
No intelligent use of such a sehec1ule is possible until a 
common denominator is established between the rating sehed-
ule and the disability to be rated. It is not enough that the 
ability or impairment is permanent disability equal to 70 percent or 
more of total, he shall be paid in addition to the compenoation due 
under this code for the permanent partial disability caused hy the last 
injury, for the remainder of the combined permanent 
disability after the last injury as provided in this article; 
provided, that the previous disability or impairment affected 
a hand, nn nrn1, a a leg, or an eye, and the perrnanent disability 
resulting from the in,iury affeets the opposite and cone-
subsequent injury, when considered alone and without •·egard to the 
sponding member, or (b) the permanent disability resulting from th" 
age of tlle employee, 1> equal to 40 percent or more of total.'' 
May 1958] GoN'zAIJEs v. INDUSTRIAL Ace. CoM. 
[50 C.2d 360; 325 P.2d 9931 
367 
disability to be rated and the occupation involved are identical 
with those appearing in the schedule. The schedule is predi-
cated upon the assumption that the age, injury and claim for 
compensation are contemporaneous. In this case the claim 
for compensation, and henee the age, occurs at time separate 
from the time of 'fhis difference the use 
of the schedule until the significance of the difference is 
analyzed to determine whether it a deviation from 
the percentage ascribed to such injury in the schedule. 
This involves an examination of the rating schedule, the 
factors considered in preparing the schedule and what it is 
designed to compensate. 
The law provides that where an employee with a pre-
existing known permanent disability receives a subsequent 
industrial injury which is independent in its effects and does 
not aggravate the preexisting permanent disability, but which 
results in additional permanent disability, the subsequent 
injuries fund is liable for the combined effect of the injuries 
if they equal a permanent disability rating of 70 per cent 
or more of total disability (Lab. Code, § 4751). Having 
created thr need for determining the percentage of permanent 
disability to total disability, the law also, by section 4660 of 
the Labor Code, prescribes how it is to be computed. 
Section 4660, subdivision (b) of the Labor Code authorizes 
the preparation of "a schedule for the determination of the 
percentage of permanent disabilities in aceordance with this 
section." The schedule prepared contains lists of particular 
injuries to which all injuries may be related, and a list of 
the more frequently found occupations. These two lists are 
correlated by means of tables. In addition there are a series 
of rating tables to correlate the relative severity of an injury 
with the age of the employee at the time of injury. Percent-
age values are assigned to eaeh injury and through the use 
of the tables these percentages are adapted to any given 
injury. 
In arriving at the value of the percentages for each listed 
injury the architects of the schedule take into consideration 
the nature of the disability as modified by age and occupation 
with consideration given to ability to compete in an open 
labor market. (See Lab. Code, § 4660, snbd. [a]; vol. 2, 
Appendix to Journal of the Senate, California Regular Ses-
sion, 1951, p. 58 of Partial Report of Senate Interim Commit-
tee to the Senate on ·workmen's Compensation Benefits [here-
inafter 1951 Partial Report].) Of course, the percentage of 
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permanent disability from an injury does not depend 
entirely on the nature of the disability. Moreover, there 
are other factors than those of age and occupation entering 
into consideration, sneh as the make-up of the man, his desire 
to recover and his inherent adaptability. However, all of 
these things affect the individual only and are not eapable of 
objective measurement or detet·mination (1951 Partial Heport, 
supra, 103). As a result only those factors des<'ribed in section 
4660, subdivision (a) of the Labor Code are considered in 
ascertaining the percentage of disability to attribute to a 
particular injury. The percentage ratings so specified are 
considered adequate on the average to eompensate for the 
residual physical disability resulting from the injury and to 
afford a reasonable period of aecommodation to the effect of 
such injury. ( 1951 Partial Hcport, supra, 68.) 
This system of disability rating is called the ''standard 
measure for determining pen~cntagc of disability to total 
disability." ( 1951 Partial Report, supra, 59.) 'rhc reason 
justifying such standardization is that it makes it possible 
to obtain uniform evaluation for identical disabilities, avoid 
unnecessary litigation, and reduce the cost thereof and ex-
pedite the promptness of evaluation ( 195] Partial Report, 
supra, 69). 
It is through the disability rating schedule that the theory 
behind the compensation of employees for industrial injuries 
is implemented. This theory is termed the theory of re-
habilitation. It assumes that a permanently injured em-
ployee either can or cannot regain his earning capacity and 
if he cannot he must be pensiont'd for life. If he can, he 
must be aided financially during the period of rehabilitation. 
Where rehabilitation to gainful employment is possible the 
amount of compensation is obviously contingent upon whether 
the injury will prevent the employee from assuming his former 
occupation, and thus, require the development of a new occu-
pational skill, or if he can resume his former job, whether 
there is any loss of past proficiency and expcctrd potential 
(sec 1951 Partial Report, S1tpra, 102). To illustrate, a book-
keeper who has lost his leg can return to his former work 
completely rehabilitated in a short tinw, while the structural 
iron worker who loses hi.s leg is forever barred from following 
his form<>r occupation. In the latt<>r case, then, the percentage 
of disability to total disability would be greater than in the 
former case, since the rehabilitation period would be more 
extensive. Therefore, in each case the accuracy and proper 
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application of the percentages appearing in the disability 
schedule must be measured according to the general consider-
ations which prompt the rehabilitation percentage value; that 
is, must the employee develop a new skill, and if not, what is 
the extent of the loss of past proficiency and expected po-
tential. 
If the prineiple of uniformity of compensation for the same 
injury is adhered to, it is only differences in the extent of 
rehabilitation which can justify a deviation from the per-
centage assigned an injury in the schedule. 
·with the revelation of the factors which permit the assign-
ment of a different percentage from that appearing in the 
schedule, it is now possible to compare the percentage value 
of the sehedule based on age forty with the injury herei11, 
and thus arrive at a pereentage of disability for an employee 
now forty, but vvho lost his speech and bearing at age five. 
The basis of comparison is the extent of rehabilitation re-
quired. The disability is rated first in accordance with the 
regularly adopted schedule and then adjusted downward or 
upward, or possibly with no change at all depending upon 
the differences in rehabilitation (see Springer v. Sttbsequent 
Injttries Fund, 21 C.C.C. 335, 342). 
The method of accomplishing this comparison is by hearing 
evidence, and with all the facts consult the disability schedule, 
computing a rating which will be in accord with the rehabili-
tation principle of the schedule. This is true regardless of 
whether the percentage is to be adapted to a case such as the 
one now before us State v. Indnstrial Ace. Corn., 129 
Cal.App.2d 302 [276 P.2d 820]) or if the rating is for un-
scheduled injuries 1951 Partial Report, supra, 58-59). 
If it is correct that the sole basis of cmnparison between 
the disability schedule and the particular injury involved 
herein is the extent of rehabilitation required, then it must 
follow that the only relevant evidence on such issue is evidence 
that tends to show similarity or dissimilarity between the 
rehabilitation required in each instance. 
The only evidence presented on this issue came from two 
of petitioner's witnesses, both of whom qualified as experts 
in the rehabilitation of deaf-mutes for gainful employment. 
The wituessrs agreed that loss of speerh and hearing at age 
40 would pose no partienlar diffienlty in an employee's ability 
to paint. Sneh a disabled rmployee could paint as well after 
the injury as he did before. The main problem would be 
placement of the worker, and its solution depends on how well 
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the could communicate to others and understand in 
some manner another's directions. It was noted that even 
assuming was the employee's prob-
lem \Vould remain communication. In other words to rehabili-
tate a deaf-mute implies that he has some means of 
and the better he can communicate the more 
the rehabilitation. 
·without eoutradiction the concurred in the opinion 
that lip was the most desirable type of communication. 
It constituted the greatest degree of rehabilitation. 
established that rehabilitation of a deaf-mute means 
learning to communicate, witness Becker testified unequivo-
cally and without dispute that a person who becomes a deaf-
mute at age 5 is not in as good a position for gainful employ-
ment and advancement in an occupation as the person who 
becomes a deaf-mute at age 40, except in individual cases. The 
reason being that a person who becomes a deaf-mute at an 
early age never makes the same adjustment as one who be-
comes a deaf-mute at age 40. A person who could hear before 
would have a better chance to go on, whereas the person who 
is a deaf-mute at age 5 is still fighting the language barrier. 
He cannot express himself in writing or otherwise as well as 
one ·who acquires the loss later. 'fhe one who acquires the 
disability at age 40 can build speech and lip reading more 
quiekly because he has a memory of speech and sound. It is 
fair to state that a man who became a deaf-mute at age 40 
would get along better, or at least as well as one who incurred 
the disability at age 5. 
·witness Jonas' testimony was substm1tially in accord with 
Becker. However, he did state that a person who became a 
deaf-mute at age 40 might have greater disability for a short 
time while he is making an adjustment to his mental problem, 
but he would not have greater disability in his vocational 
problem because he has a greater ability to read and write. 
Since the rehabilitation here involved pertains to a return to 
gainful employment the mental aspect is not relevant. 
The conclusions to be drawn from this testimony are self-
evident. It would appear that Gonzales' disability rating can 
be no less than that of a man incurring the injury at 40. 
The evidence upon which the majority relies to uphold the 
panel's finding is irrelevant and immaterial to the issue of a 
comparison between the rehabilitation problems of a man who 
incurs loss of speech and hearing at age 40 and a man age 40 
who incurred a similar injury at age 5. 'l'his evidence reads 
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as follows: ". . . had been a deaf-mute from the 
age of five years and was unable to read lips; that he had 
learned the painting trade when he was 14; that he had been 
a prize fighter and an aircraft worker during the war; and 
that in 1944 he joined the painters' union and had worked 
steadily from that time until the accident. It further dis-
closes that since his recovery he has worked as as any 
other member of the painters' union." Although it is not 
clear, the utilizes this evidence 
to demonstrate that Gonzales is rehabilitated to a greater 
degree in comparison to a man who at 40 becomes a deaf-mute. 
If I have correctly perceived the use of this evidence then 
it is patently clear that the use of it by the majority is in-
correct. In fact the evidence is not a comparison at all, but 
merely the biographical facts of Gonzales' life. By them-
selves they are no more significant than anyone else's past 
employment history. 
The essential element to be established is whether Gonzales 
has been vocationally rehabilitated to a greater degree than 
an employee who lost his speech and hearing at age 40. The 
evidence used by the majority is only probative on this point 
if we accept the premise that because a deaf-mute has had 
40 years to adjust to his disability he has accomplished greater 
rehabilitation than one who at age 40 incurs such a disability. 
According to the uncontradicted expert testimony in this case 
the premise is false. Quite unfortunately it was first pro-
pounded in State v. Industrial Ace. Com., supra. At the 
time it was made there was no basis in the record for such 
a conclusion. Upon remand of the case to the commission 
it appeared that the premise was to be buried after expert 
evidence had refuted the truth of it (Springer v. Subse-
quent Injuries Fund, supra, 338). The expert evidence in 
that case was substantially the same as the expert testimony 
herein. Thus, the attempt by the majority to resurrect this 
premise leads to an untoward and ill-advised result, and it 
should be scrapped for the same reason it was in Spr'inger v. 
Subseqtwnt Injuries Fund, supra. 
If the evidence upon which the majority relies is to have 
any relevance at all, it must be to show that Gonzales is an 
exceptional individual with better powers of adjustment than 
the average person incurring such disability at age 40. Such 
proof would then justify a deviation from the disability sched-
ule which is based upon the average individual and be in 
keeping with the expert testimony which likewise was phrased 
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in terms of the averag-e. However, here again the evidence 
is not to such an infer<'ll('<'. In order to show that 
Gonzales is exceptional there must be either a comparison with 
an average person, or a demonstration that his past actions 
are so remarkable that he may be (•a lied ('Xl:cpt ional. Sine<:: the 
re<:ord is deYoid of auy eYidenee of a eomparison, this ground 
eannot form the basis f'or a finding that <lonzales was excep-
tionaL \Y c do know that Gonzales, in addition to being a 
, was a prize fighter and ain:rafi. >Yorker. But this evi-
dente, vvithout more, does not tell us that he was exceptional. 
He eould have been inept in all fields. In view of the false 
premise that vvas unwi8ely announced in State v. Industrial 
Ace. Com., supra, we should remain (:iremm;peet in making 
ally sueh as8umptions from the history of past employment 
without any elaboration in the record to support it. 
Portunately we need not rely on Iaek of evidenee to prove 
irrelevance, for there is affirmative, uncontradicted evidence 
that shovvs Gonzales i8 no more than average. This evidence 
is the fact that Gonzales cannot lip reacl. It is true that past 
aets do show !-lome measure of adjustment, at present he can 
at least hold a position, but the experts all agree that the 
failure to lip read will alway8 prevent rehabilitation to the 
degree one may attain if the injury is incurred at age 40. 
'l'he error of the majority is that it equates the length of 
time si.nce the injury with yoeational adjustment. One does 
not necessarily follow from the other. It is not time that 
promises profieiency, but the dimension of the disability. 
Moreover, if the majority opinion is allowed to stand it will 
undermine the theory supporting a uniform disability sched-
ule. In the Springer ease, whieh the majority concedes is 
factually indistinguishable from the instant ease, an award 
against the subsequent injurie8 fund was upheld (21 C.C.C. 
335, 337). lf this is correet, then what rational basis can 
there be for not allowing an award here~ If the principle of 
uniformity in award8 for the same injury is to have any 
effieacy the result in the Springer ease should be followed. 
Por the foregoing reasons I would annul the decision of the 
commission and remand the proceeding. 
Gibson, C. J., and Traynor, J., coucurrrd. 
Petitioner's application for a rehearing was denied ,June 
25, 1!)58. Gibson, C. J., Carter, .J., and Traynor, .J., were 
of the opiniou that the applieation should be granted. 
